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Abstract—Although Vehicular Networks are still on the
drawing board, the recent announcement by the NHTSA that
they will begin working on regulations for V2V (Vehicle-to-
Vehicle) communication has spurred concerns that more and
more personal data may be unduly disseminated as we drive
our cars. We examine a scenario where vehicles use anonymous
certificates, provided by a central authority, and do not divulge
their position (e.g., for the purpose of accident prevention), but
merely exchange contextual traffic information (congestion,
roadworks, accidents in the area...). The reliability of such
information is corroborated by the vehicle reputation, assigned
by a Central Controller (CC). The mechanisms that lead to
the forming of vehicle reputation are outside the scope of this
paper. We are instead interested in designing a system for the
robust dissemination of reputation and in understanding its
implications on user privacy.
I. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that vehicles use Inter-Vehicle Communica-
tion (IVC) to interact with other vehicles and with RoadSide
Units (RSUs), when under coverage. We also assume that
RSUs do not provide a continuous coverage of the entire
map, so that vehicles spend some time outside direct
coverage of RSUs, although they can communicate with
nearby vehicles. Vehicle identities are anonymized through
the use of pseudonyms [1], i.e., short-lived certificates that
are provided to vehicles and periodically refreshed when
they are under RSU coverage. Certificates are used to prove
that vehicle X is a legitimate part of the IVC network
and, as we shall detail below, to establish the reputation of
the vehicle. Upon each encounter with an RSU, a vehicle
can request a certificate refill and it receives C anonymous
certificates, each with a fixed lifetime TL established by the
RSU. The lifetime is necessary to simplify revocation and
we assume it is generally longer that the actual certificate
usage time by each vehicle. We assume that the protocol
exchange that leads to a certificate refill occurs on a secure
channel established between a Central Controller (CC) and
the vehicle, through the RSU. In order to minimize the
chance of being tracked, a vehicle uses a certificate only
for a time TC < TL at most, before discarding it. To
summarize, in the i-th time interval of duration TC , a
certificate χX(i) is associated to a pair of private/public
keys {kX(i),KX(i)} that vehicle X uses to authenticate
the messages it sends throughout that time interval.
The reputation of vehicles is managed by the CC and
it is classified out of R classes, based on evidence of
previous misconduct, or lack thereof. Beside managing
the reputation, the CC can link certificates to real IDs
of vehicles and thus knows: (i) which certificates belong
to which vehicle; (ii) what is the current reputation class
of the vehicle. Consequently, the CC can establish the
reputation of any vehicles that issues a specific certificate.
The goal of the system is to enable vehicles to identify
the reputation class of another vehicle they are receiving
information from, without the need to divulge the identity
of either vehicle. Such a goal can be achieved in different
ways, not all viable in the sparsely connected scenario we
are considering, or computationally efficient. For example,
the updated reputation score could be provided and signed
by the CC upon every certificate refill, but then it would be
up to the vehicle to use it (or misuse it). Or, the score could
be cryptographically embedded (though publicly verifiable)
in the certificates issued by the CC, but this solution would
still leave a TL window of vulnerability for misuse in case
the reputation changes in the meantime.
The system we envision leverages the use of Bloom
filters for reputation advertisement. Bloom filters are prob-
abilistic data structures that allow a verifier to establish
with certainty whether an element is part of a set, although
they may yield false positives for elements not part of
that set. The use of Bloom filters for VANET certificate
management (specifically for their revocation) has already
been advocated in the literature, e.g., by [2].
We assume that the CC periodically uses a Bloom filter
to summarize the certificates currently assigned to each
vehicle in a class and whose lifetime has not expired. In
other words, for each of the R classes, the CC feeds each
certificate of that class to k hash functions and computes
a Bloom filter of size m bits. Such filters are periodically
broadcasted by each RSU and received by vehicles under
their coverage. Vehicles store the filters for offline use
when outside RSU coverage. When vehicle A sends traffic
information during a time interval i, it signs the message
using the private key kA(i) associated to the (anonymous)
certificate χi it is using in that time interval. The signed
message is broadcast together with certificate χi. Vehicle
B verifies the validity of the message (i.e., that it was
broadcasted by a legitimate member of the IVC) using
public key kA(i) associated to the certificate attached to
the message. Subsequently, vehicle B can easily identify
the reputation of vehicle A (and thus decide whether or not
to trust the traffic information) by matching the certificate
with one of the R Bloom filters it has stored since its last
encounter with an RSU.
II. DIMENSIONING THE SYSTEM
In order to quantify the impact of our solution and its
effectiveness, one of the main metrics is the probability
of multiple class matching, pM . Multiple class matching
is a consequence of false positives in Bloom filters and
it is computed as the probability that a certificate issued
by vehicles A is detected by vehicle B as belonging to
two or more classes (only one of them being correct).
Multiple matchings invalidate the procedure to establish
the reputation. From [3], we derive the probability of false
positives when n elements are inserted in one bloom filter
of size m bits using k independent hash functions:
pF =
(
1−
(
1−
1
m
)kn)k
,
therefore, under the simplifying assumption that all classes
have the same pF , the probability of multiple class matching
can be written as:
pM = 1− (1− pF )
R−1.
The above equations allow the dimensioning of key
system variables, such as the size of Bloom filters and the
number of certificates that can be refilled. Let us look at a
practical example with some simplifying assumptions.
Road map and vehicles. Consider a 1km x 1km grid
road map, consisting of 11 equispaced horizontal roads
intersecting 6 equispaced vertical roads, for a total of 17
km of roads on the map. All roads are single-lane and
bidirectional. Some RSUs (the exact number is not relevant
in our example) provide coverage on the map and feed the
Bloom filters to passing vehicles. In a mildly congested
scenario, assuming that vehicles travel 10 m apart on
average, we would find 1,700 vehicles on the map at any
given time.
Certificates and filter refresh rate. In order to avoid tracking,
vehicles use a certificate only for limited time TC . They will
therefore pre-load up to C certificates from a nearby RSU
when their certificate buffer is almost empty. For example,
if we assume that C = 60 and that each certificate is only
used for TC = 30 seconds before being discarded, vehicles
can expect 30-minutes’ worth of certificates upon each refill.
The lifetime of each issued certificate can be set by the CC
as TL = CTC . Thus, the Bloom filters must be suitably
dimensioned so as to provide a low pM when subject to a
large intake of certificates. In particular, Bloom filters have
to be frequently reset and recomputed to be able to track
potential reputation changes. We will assume a one-minute
filter refresh rate for every reputation class.
Number of certificates and multiple matching probability.
During the one-minute refresh period, the Bloom filter of
each reputation class should be loaded with all current
certificates (i.e., those downloaded in the past 30 minutes)
of vehicles in that class. For simplicity, we only consider
vehicles that are on the map when the filter is refreshed.
Given the above parameters, and setting k = 3 and R = 5,
in Fig. 1 we plot pM as a function of the number of
certificates that each car is allowed to store, for different
values of filter sizes (in bytes). It can be seen that the
probability of multiple matching is lower than 0.01 for the
value C = 60 used in our previous example and the filter
size is just 256 bytes, which entails that filters for several
classes could be broadcast by an RSU in a single message.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is well known in the literature that vehicle data
(such as ID, position, direction) issued by beaconing as
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Fig. 1. Probability of multiple class matching as a function of the number
of refilled certificates per vehicle, for different Bloom filter sizes.
mandated by IEEE 1609.2 makes vehicles susceptible of
being tracked by eavesdroppers. Even if the ID of the
vehicle is anonymized through the use of pseudonyms,
tracking is still considered to be possible [4], and several
proposals exist to avoid explicit position advertisement in
beacons. However, even in the absence of explicit position
as in the system we have examined, a vehicle could still
be tracked by correlating other information leaked by the
vehicle. The system described above could lead to potential
vehicle tracking by an internal attacker that can eavesdrop
by disseminating a large number of rogue micro RSUs in
the area. The attacker can then correlate segments of the
map where the same certificate was used. Such an approach
could however be thwarted if certificate usage times TC
were drastically reduced, although this would require the
downloading and buffering of a larger batch of certificates
from RSUs. As shown in Fig. 1, this can be achieved at the
cost of larger filter sizes, to avoid increasing the likelihood
of multiple matching. Further vehicle tracking could result
from the attacker correlating the number of vehicles in each
reputation class, collected by its rogue RSUs at different
times. Given the system we have devised, such an attack
would be independent from the certificate lifetime or num-
ber, since the Bloom filter would unequivocally link each
certificate to a reputation class. The latter approach could
however be thwarted if the reputation class of a vehicle can
be randomly obfuscated (without excessively altering the
real vehicle reputation). We leave the investigation of these
issues for future work.
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